Go Around Events

Origin and history

Go-around events are a procedural safety response within aviation whose formal recognition and documentation evolved alongside instrument landing systems in the mid-20th century. The concept originates from the broader, global development of standardized air traffic control and approach procedures following World War II. The term "go-around" itself became codified in international aviation lexicons, notably within ICAO documentation, as precision approach capabilities became widespread. Its history is intertwined with the increasing complexity of high-density airspace and the advent of jet aircraft, which required more definitive missed approach protocols. The procedural discipline surrounding go-arounds was further solidified through accident investigations that highlighted the dangers of continued unstable approaches. Therefore, the modern go-around event is not an invention of a single country but a globally established safety practice, with its critical importance reinforced through decades of safety data analysis and regulatory guidance.

What it is for

A go-around event is the execution of a pre-planned abort procedure during the final stage of an aircraft's approach to land. Its primary function is to eliminate the significant safety risk posed by continuing an unstable or otherwise unsafe approach to the runway. This procedure is initiated either by the flight crew or commanded by air traffic control when specific safety criteria are not met, such as incorrect aircraft configuration, excessive deviation from the glide path, or unexpected runway obstructions. The action involves applying take-off power, climbing to a specified safe altitude, and following a published missed approach segment to re-enter the traffic pattern. It serves as a fundamental risk-mitigation tool, converting a high-workload, high-risk situation into a controlled, climb-phase flight regime. Ultimately, the go-around exists to provide a safe, standardized alternative to a forced or compromised landing, thereby protecting the aircraft, its occupants, and ground infrastructure.

Pros and cons

It provides a clear, rehearsed escape path from numerous potential hazards, including wind shear, traffic conflicts, and equipment malfunctions. A significant con, however, is the operational and economic disruption it causes, including schedule delays, increased fuel consumption, and potential passenger discomfort or concern. A more subtle drawback is the potential for "go-around stigma," where a crew might perceive the maneuver as an admission of error, potentially discouraging its timely use. This can lead to the common and dangerous mistake of attempting to "salvage" an unstable approach rather than initiating a go-around at the first appropriate cue. The procedure also introduces its own complex workload and coordination challenges during a critical phase, requiring precise communication and aircraft handling to avoid new conflicts, meaning those who regret it are often focusing on short-term operational pressures rather than long-term safety outcomes.

Who it suits

The go-around procedure is a mandatory, non-negotiable component of all professional flight operations under instrument flight rules and is embedded in the training and procedures of every commercial airline worldwide. It suits the operational reality of any air carrier, from large passenger networks to cargo operators, where systemic safety management prioritizes procedural adherence over individual judgment in defined risk scenarios. The discipline is equally critical for air traffic controllers, who require a clear, predictable response when issuing a go-around instruction to manage traffic flow and runway occupancy. It suits high-reliability organizations that understand a reported go-around is not a failure but a valuable data point for safety management systems. Conversely, it is ill-suited to any operational culture that implicitly or explicitly penalizes crews for conducting safety-driven go-arounds, as this erodes the essential safety barrier. Therefore, it fundamentally suits any aviation system built upon layered defenses and a just culture of safety reporting.